Ramblemuse Touch Points

I’ve been reading the comments Elise Hancock makes on scientific opinion and consensus (pages 14-18) in her book on Science Writing, Ideas into Words. Hancock characterizes, correctly I believe, that scientific consensus is not like the precedence of law. In law, there are conflicting opinions and the precedence of former court cases, but there is no ultimate source of reality. Thus, at least at some point, all opinions start on an equal footing in that law is an entirely human creation. In science, consensus is developed by the accumulation of observations of the external world, analysis, and peer-review of the process to insure, as best as is humanly possible, the rigor of the conclusion. Hancock also stresses that scientific “mavericks” are generally to be avoided.

In a profession that makes a fetish of evidence and preserving an open mind, the true scientific outsider, fighting the same lonely battle year after year and claiming that no one will let him publish, is unlikely to have a case. Reasearch opposing the current model can and does get published.

In a Caltech commencement address given in 1974, the late physicist Richard Feynmann gave a succinct summary of the scientific process.

Now it behooves me, of course, to tell you what they’re missing. But it would be just about as difficult to explain to the South Sea islanders how they have to arrange things so that they get some wealth in their system. It is not something simple like telling them how to improve the shapes of the earphones. But there is one feature I notice that is generally missing in cargo cult science. That is the idea that we all hope you have learned in studying science in school–we never say explicitly what this is, but just hope that you catch on by all the examples of scientific investigation. It is interesting, therefore, to bring it out now and speak of it explicitly. It’s a kind of scientific integrity, a principle of scientific thought that corresponds to a kind of utter honesty–a kind of leaning over backwards. For example, if you’re doing an experiment, you should report everything that you think might make it invalid–not only what you think is right about it: other causes that could possibly explain your results; and things you thought of that you’ve eliminated by some other experiment, and how they worked–to make sure the other fellow can tell they have been eliminated.

Details that could throw doubt on your interpretation must be given, if you know them. You must do the best you can–if you know anything at all wrong, or possibly wrong–to explain it. If you make a theory, for example, and advertise it, or put it out, then you must also put down all the facts that disagree with it, as well as those that agree with it. There is also a more subtle problem. When you have put a lot of ideas together to make an elaborate theory, you want to make sure, when explaining what it fits, that those things it fits are not just the things that gave you the idea for the theory; but that the finished theory makes something else come out right, in addition.

In summary, the idea is to give all of the information to help others to judge the value of your contribution; not just the information that leads to judgement in one particular direction or another.

In research, we see the opportunity to do the research, publish it, and at times to shift the scientific consensus. Hancock provides a few examples of this, including the identification of Helicobactor pylori as a major cause of stomache ulcers. A similar occurrence that I’ve noted in the recent medical news is the identification of a fungi-triggered immune response as a major cause of chronic sinusitis.

Research and the research literature is thus the place to question the current paradigm of consensus and to defend new hypotheses. It is the area in which a general consensus emerges that defines the scientific viewpoint. There may well be continuing discussion and debate on specific issues within such a consensus, but this should not be construed by the press or public as absence of an overall consensus. This is as true in the areas of human-induced climate change (aka global warming) and in evolution of species as in any other area of science. The consensus supports both of these conclusions while questions of details remain. Those who believe they have research challenging or modifying one consensus or the other have every opportunity to contribute at the level of research and peer-reviewed publication.

In contrast to academic science, most professions have a distinction between research and professional application. This distinction has likely not been as strongly developed in much of science because, until recently, scientifc issues lacked immediate negative consequences to society and were not highly politicized. These times have obviously changed. In contrast to research, application operates within the current envelope of consensus. This is most obvious in civil engineering and medical practice, where straying far from consensus practice opens the door to malpractice and other liability lawsuits. Innovations happen, but they require substantial vetting by testing and peer-review (i.e. research documentation) before they become the basis for treating patients or supporting a building structure. Unlike what has been happening in discussions in climate change or evolution, there is not a concerted effort to circumvent the protocols by taking it to the media. One existing example in which scientific application has already been separated from scientific research is in the certification of broadcast meteorologists by the American Meteorological Society. You don’t have to be a researcher to qualify, but you do have to be practicing within the current consensus of meteorology.

Those who are practicing as experts in climate change or development of species, yet are publicly proclaiming themselves to be outside of the developed scientific consensus, place themselves in the paradoxical position of Epimenides the Cretan, famous for the statement that, “All Cretans are liars“. If they are practicing within a profession in an applied sense yet outside of the consensus of practice, then they are committing malpractice. If they are not part of the profession, then they have no claim to be experts within it and are simply offering up a lay opinion, a fact of which the public should be advised. It’s simply high time that we differentiate between the advancement of discussion within research and the professional application of scientific expertise within society.

As to climate change, the definitive international scientific consensus is captured in the reports issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). There’s a blog put out by climate scientists operating within this consensus at Real Climate. On broader issues, The American Psychological Association has a page on issues of scientific integrity. The Union of Concerned Scientists also addresses issues of misuse and misrepresentation of science.